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Office of the United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street 
Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
__________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Daaniyal Muhammad appeals from the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, which ordered that he be made fit for trial by medicating him against his 
will. In limited circumstances, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), authorizes such 
orders if the Court makes four predicate findings. Before a court reaches Sell’s four-part 
inquiry, however, the government ordinarily must show why medication cannot be 
administered pursuant to other procedures, such as those described in Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), or 28 C.F.R. § 549.43. United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 
591, 599 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We do not reach consideration of the four-factor Sell test 
unless an inmate does not qualify for forcible medication under Harper”). This case is 
unusual in that Muhammad expressly waived any claim or right he may have had under 
Harper or § 549.43. As a result, the sole question we must answer is whether the District 
Court properly applied Sell. We hold that it did, and will affirm.
1
 
I. 
                                                 
1 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because Muhammad was 
charged with violating the laws of the United States. We have jurisdiction under the 
collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Grape, 549 F.3d at 597. 
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We write for the parties in this case only, and we state the facts and the District 
Court procedures only as necessary to explain our reasoning. 
Muhammad, who was indicted for conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, suffers 
from schizophrenia and other mental disorders. Although profoundly disabled by these 
diseases, Muhammad refuses antipsychotic medication, and declines to participate in 
psychotherapy or any other form of mental health treatment. In his un-medicated state, he 
is unable to appreciate the charges against him or to assist in his defense, and as a result 
he is unfit to stand trial. To restore Muhammad’s competency, the government moved for 
the District Court to order him medicated pursuant to Sell. The District Court granted the 
government’s motion after applying Sell’s four-part balancing test, and Muhammad 
appealed. 
Before oral argument, we requested additional briefing on whether Muhammad’s 
condition poses a danger to himself or others, thus triggering the due process procedures 
mandated by § 549.43 and Harper, 494 U.S. at 210. The government contended that 
Harper and § 549.43 were not relevant and Muhammad agreed, stating that they were 
“not appropriate in this case as there was no evidence that Appellant posed a danger to 
others.” Because neither party disputed Muhammad’s rights or remedies under Harper 
and § 549.43, we do not reach those issues. See United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 
F.3d 908, 915 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court did not err in “honoring the 
parties’ agreement to proceed directly to the Sell inquiry.”). 
II. 
We begin with the law of pre-conviction involuntary medication. If, as in this case, 
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a district court finds a criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court must 
commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 4241. The 
Attorney General must hospitalize and treat the defendant until competency returns, 
unless medical professionals determine that to do so would require an unreasonable 
amount of time. Id. § 4241(d). 
While in the Attorney General’s custody, inmates maintain substantial liberty 
interests, including the interest in avoiding unwanted medication. Harper, 494 U.S. at 229 
(“The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a 
substantial interference with that person’s liberty.”). “In the case of antipsychotic drugs,” 
like the ones Muhammad may be given, “that interference is particularly severe: [t]he 
purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to 
changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes. While the 
therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the 
drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects.” Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 
(1992) (citations omitted). 
Nonetheless, upon “a finding of overriding justification and a determination of 
medical appropriateness,” a defendant’s liberty interest may yield to the legitimate needs 
of government. Id. at 135. The Sell Court recognized that Riggins “will permit 
involuntary administration of drugs solely for trial competence purposes in certain 
instances,” adding, “[b]ut those instances may be rare.” 539 U.S. at 180; cf. United States 
v. McCray, 474 F. Supp. 2d 671, 678 (D.N.J. 2007); United States v. Dumeny, 295 F. 
Supp. 2d 131, 132-133 (D. Me. 2004). Sell authorizes such orders only in the limited 
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circumstances where (1) important governmental interests are at stake, (2) involuntary 
medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests, (3) involuntary 
medication is necessary to further those interests, and (4) involuntary medication is 
medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical 
condition. 539 U.S. at 180-181; see also United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
III. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s order. The absence of dispute regarding Harper 
and § 549.43 limits us to the narrow question of whether the Court properly applied the 
four Sell factors. We have reviewed the record and we are satisfied that the Court’s 
opinion responded to the contentions Muhammad has made before us. We will affirm its 
judgment without further discussion.  
 
